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ROE V. DOE: CHILD'S RIGHT
TO A COLLEGE EDUCATION
V. PARENT'S RIGHT
OF CONTROL*
Antagonism created by the exercise of parental authority and
adolescent resistance to such authority is not unique to today's parentchild relationships.' However, whereas in the past such family conflicts
were settled within the family itself, remedies are now sought in legal
actions initiated by independent off-spring2 who insist that they be
absolutely free to live according to their own values, but demand that
parents provide for their support.
In the instant case of Mary Roe v. John Doe,3 the petitioner, a
twenty-year-old female college student, attending school away from
home, decided, after living in a college dormitory, to reside off-campus.
This move was contrary to her father's prior instructions. In addition
to being placed on academic probation by the university, she had also
experimented with drugs, including LSD and marijuana, although it
appeared that she was not an addict. The father, a prominent attorney,

* This article is a student work prepared by William C. Podurgiel, a member of
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.

1 The parable of the "Prodigal Son" leaving home only to return at a later date.
Luke 15:1-32.
2 Prior to 1969, under the holding of Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162
N.E. 551 (1928), an interfamily suit based on the commission of a tort was prohibited by the courts on the assumption that such a suit would create discord in
a family.
This prohibition was diluted by the New York Court of Appeals in Gelbman
v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), noted in
44 ST JOHN'S L. REV. 127 (1969). In reversing Sorrentino the Court held that
with the advent of insurance coverage such a suit would aid the cohesiveness of
a family by affording the injured member a means of recovering his loss. See also
Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963).
3 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).
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upon learning of her off-campus residence,
immediately terminated all support and
directed that she return home. The daughter
refused to comply with his wishes and, instead, sold her car and lived off the proceeds.
During the following summer, while she
was living with the parents of a friend, the
daughter commenced a support proceeding
in the New York Family Court in which she
alleged her father's refusal to and neglect in
providing for her fair and reasonable support. The family court, in holding for the
daughter, issued two separate orders: a
temporary support order requiring that the
father pay his daughter's tuition for the
forthcoming semester as well as all reasonable medical expenses; and a final support
order requiring that he pay $250 per month
in support until his daughter reached her
twenty-first birthday. The father refused to
comply with the court orders and, as a result, was ordered committed to prison for
thirty days. After he posted a bond equivalent to the amount due, the commitment
order was stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First
Department, modified the family court
order 4 by directing that the father pay only
those university and health bills that had
arisen prior to November 30, 1970, the
date of the family court's final order of
$250 per month support, and reversing the
final order requiring payment of the $250
5
per month. The Court of Appeals affirmed

4 Roe v. Doe, 36 App. Div. 2d 162, 318 N.Y.S.

2d 973 (1st Dep't 1971).
5 Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567,
324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).

the appellate division decision and held that
when a minor of employable age and in full
possession of her faculties, voluntarily and
without cause, abandons the parents' home,
against the parents' will, for the purpose of
avoiding parental control, all rights to support are forfeited. 6 It also indicated that
courts should be extremely reluctant to become involved in situations of this type,
characterizing the family court's action in
these affairs as an unwarranted intrusion
based upon standards of decorum established by the Court of Appeals.7
Although the issue was novel in New
York, the underlying principle that a minor
forfeits all rights to support when he places
himself beyond effective control of his parents can easily be traced back to the common law. Under the common law, a parent's
duties to his legitimate offspring were to provide for their maintenance, protection and
education.8 In Roe the Court of Appeals reaffirmed this premise by viewing a parent as
chargeable with the discipline and support
of his offspring.9 The Court also pointed
out that these parental obligations are not
terminated by the delinquent behavior of a
minor child, even if such behavior is unexplained and persistent. 10 However, under
the common law, the courts held that they

(; Id. at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 571, 324 N.Y.S.2d
at 76. See 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 16 (1950).
The responsibility of parents terminates when a
minor leaves home voluntarily or becomes emancipated.
7 Id. at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d at
75.
8 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 446.
9 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 569, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 74 (1971).
10 Id.
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did not have the power to enforce such
"natural obligations."'"
The facts presented in the instant case are
unique in American jurisprudence. In the
vast majority of cases in which child support is ordered, there is present some degree
of family discord, such as divorce or separation. 12 In the instant case, however, there
was no divorce or separation of the parents;
the father had remarried several times after
the death of the daughter's mother.
Courts have generally recognized the
duty of a parent to provide an education for
his children.' 3 For many years courts have

It Wellesley v. iDuke of Beauford, 2 Russ. 3-23
(1827). But see Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng.
Rep. 1080 (1828) where the chancellor felt he
had the power to act for the benefit of the child.
12 See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1,
430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24
Ill. App. 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Hart v.
Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948);
Barry v. Barry, 291 Mich. 666, 289 N.W. 397
(1932); O'Brien v. Springer, 202 Misc. 210, 107
N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1951).
Contra, Blau v. Blau, 199 Pa. Super. 467, 185
A.2d 804 (1962) (wherein the father was ordered
to provide support even though there was no
divorce, since he had expressly agreed to support
the child).
13 Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947);
Board of Educ. v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E.
896 (1897); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61
N.E. 730 (1901) (parent convicted of violation
of state statute in not sending his child to school);
Division of Pub. Assistance v. Mills, 391 S.W.2d
363 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Santasiero v. Briggs,
278 App. Div. 15, 103 N.Y.S.2d I (3d Dep't
1951); Crawford v. District School Bd., 68 Ore.
388, 137 P.217 (1913) (father is charged by law
with the duty of support and education of his
children); Gully v. Gully, 111 Tex. 233, 231
S.W. 97 (1921). See also 67 C.J.S. Parent and
Child § 15 (1950) discussing the duty and liability of a parent as to support and education.

imposed upon the father the responsibility
of furnishing at least a minimum level of
education, such as a grade or common
school education. 14 It has usually been held
when there has been no break-up of the
family unit, it is the father's prerogative to
decide the level of education he will furnish
for his children and if he has decided that
a college education is either unnecessary or
an undue strain upon the family's finances,
the courts have not interfered.' 5 This precedent was followed to a certain extent in the
instant case when the Court declared that
it was the parent's natural right as well as
his legal duty to control, to care for and to
protect his minor children without judicial
interference-absent evidence of the parent's misfeasance, neglect or arbitrariness.' 6
On the other hand, the courts have involved themselves with the question of the
extent of a minor's education where there
is evidence of family disharmony. In such
cases, courts will generally require a parent
to pay for a college education only when
there has been either a separation or divorce and the minor no longer is in the
father's legal custody. 17 In these situations,

14 Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683
(1844). See generally I J. SCHOULER, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

ch. 9 § 744 (Duty of Education) (6th ed. 1921).
15 Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P.264
(1926).
Whenever a father has the custody of a child,
the law presumes that he will provide for the
child's education in the vocation for which it
is best fitted and which will enable it to meet
the conditions of modern life.
Id. at 184, 244 P. at 267.
16 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 75.
17 Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 IIl. App.2d 32, 163
N.E.2d 840 (1959); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore.
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decisions have been based on the ground
that the father may no longer be in a position to realize the educational requirements
of his child, as well as the possibility that
he might be less motivated by natural affection to provide a college education.' 8
However, the courts are not unanimous
in finding a college education to be necessary, even where the parents are divorced
or separated. 9 Some courts feel that a
proper education is a "necessity" but will
impose only a requirement of a gradeschool education.2 0 In the majority of cases,
nevertheless, judges have gone further and
presumed that support will be provided by
the father during the entire period of high
school unless the father clearly establishes
that he is unable to furnish this additional
expense. 21 Other courts have even expanded
the requirement of support during high
school and held that although a father is
generally under no duty to provide a college
education, he may be required to do so
under certain circumstances. 22 Finally,

626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941). See generally Bosley,
Child Support-Protectingthe Child's Interest, 4
FAMILY L.Q. 230 (1970).
Is 138 Wash. at 176, 244 P. at 267 (1926).
19 Halsted v. Halsted, 288 App. Div. 298, 299,
239 N.Y.S. 422, 424 (2d Dep't 1930). "Unlike
the furnishing of a common school education to
an infant, the furnishing of a classical or professional education by a parent to a child is not a
'necessary.' "
20 Sisson v. Schultz, 251 Mich. 553, 232 N.W.
253 (1930).
21 See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1,
430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); cf. Golay v. Golay, 35
Wash. 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949). See Inker
& McGrath, College Education of Minors, 6 J.
FAMILY L.Q. 230 (1966) (discussing the divorced
father's emerging legal obligations).
22 Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d
50 (Ind. 1968), wherein the court applied the

some tribunals have held that a father is
chargeable with providing that level of education which is consistent with his financial
23
ability.
Once a court has decided that a minor
child is entitled to support until he completes his college education, there are two
approaches used to enforce the father's support obligation. Either, the common law
definition of "necessary" 24 is expanded, or
the courts utilize the powers granted to
them under various divorce statutes to
25
compel child support.

Indiana Annotated

Statutes

STAT. ANN.§ 3-1219

(1968):

(1968).

See

IND.

The court may require the father to provide
all or some specified part of the cost of education of such child or children beyond the
twelfth year of education provided by the public schools, taking into consideration the earnings of the father.
23 Weingast v. Weingast, 44 Misc. 2d 952, 255
N.Y.S.2d 341 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
(Petitioner sought to obtain additional money
to defray the expense of the child's college education. Today with a college education being a
necessity the court looked at the father's financial ability and ordered him to pay the child's
expenses.) See H. FOSTER & D. FREED, LAW AND

(New York) Ch. 23 (Child Support)
(1966) [hereinafter FOSTER & FREED].
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See, e.g., 138 Wash. at 182, 244 P. at 267.
"Where the college graduate of that day was the
exception, today such a person may almost be
said to be the rule." Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10
Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct.
1959) (awards for a college education made in
behalf of a child displaying sufficient capacity
are within the contemplation of the common-law
rule); Atchley v. Atchley, 29 Tenn. App. 124,
194 S.W.2d 252 (1946); Feek v. Feek, 187
Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936).
25 The common-law rule as to the liability of a
father for necessaries has been supplanted by
statutory provisions. See Jackman v. Short, 165
Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941). See also Rawley
v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891
24
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Those courts which do not require support until a minor completes his college
education generally rely upon a narrow
interpretation of the term "necessary" to
mean only those items which are dire necessities. 2 6 Courts which do require support
during college years generally take the approach that a college education is "necessary" today in order to properly raise a
child in our modern technological society;
for it is believed that in order to advance
in life, higher levels of education are now
27
demanded.
In addition to finding some degree of
rupture in the family relationship, certain
other factors must also be present before a
parent is required to provide a college edu28
cation. First, the child must be a minor;

(Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Hale v. Hale, 55 Cal.
App. 2d 879, 132 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
Luques v. Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 A. 263
(1928); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78
N.W.2d 216 (1956); Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449,
118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla.
285, 222 P. 547 (1924); Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis.
466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
20 "[Ilt has been declared to be the law . . .
that a college education is not included among
the necessaries which a parent is legally required
to furnish." Ford v. Ford, 109 Ohio App. 495,
496, 167 N.E.2d 787, 788 (1959) (court granted
support but did not state that it was for college
expenses). Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65,
171 N.E. 386 (1931); Strayer v. Strayer, 26 N.J.
Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (Ch. 1948); Streitwolf v.
Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 43 A, 904 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1899).
27 See Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d
441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959) (court discusses competition with the Russians for ideological supremacy). See also Payette v. Payette, 85
N.H. 297, 157 A. 531 (1931); Feek v. Feek, 187
Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936); Esteb v. Esteb,
138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). See generally
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957).
28 Genda v. Superior Ct., 103 Ariz. 240, 439

second, he must be unemancipated; 29 third,
the child must be in the legal custody of a
third party; 30 fourth, the father must be
financially able to furnish a college education; and fifth, the child should be able
to successfully undertake a college-level
education. 31
When a legal separation or divorce has
cccurred, courts generally assume a paternal attitude. After examining all of the
relevant factors listed above, a judge will
decide what the father would have done
under the same circumstances and will act

P.2d 811 (1968); Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App.
2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1968); Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d 50 (1968); Davis
v. Davis, 8 Mich. App. 104, 153 N.W.2d 879
(1967); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super. 26, 69
A.2d 752 (1949) (provides exception if child is
crippled); Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479,
150 N.E.2d 421 (1958); Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis.
466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
29 See, e.g., Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144
N.W.2d 104 (1966) (although both children
have left the father's home they continue to reside with the mother). See also Codornz v.
Codornz, 34 Cal. 2d 811, 215 P.2d 32 (1950);
Broemmer v. Broemmer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1949).
30 Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750
(1936); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109
P.2d 860 (1941); Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573,
60 P.2d 686 (1936); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash.
174, 244 P. 264 (1926). See also Inker & McGrath, College Education of Minors, 6 FAMILY

L.Q. 230 (1966).
31 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1965); Pincus v. Pincus, 197 A.2d
854 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964); Maitzen v.
Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840
(1959); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78
N.W.2d 216 (1956); Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449,
118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Herbert v. Herbert, 198
Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174,
244 P.264 (1926).
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accordingly. In Gerk v. Gerk , ' the Supreme Court of Iowa expanded the obligation to provide a college education, where
there had been no divorce or legal separation but only a "de facto" separation.
Therein, the mother had deserted the father
and had wrongfully taken custody of the
child. The father was ordered to furnish a
college education for his minor child.
In Roe v. Doe, the family court ordered
the father to provide support while the
daughter attended college even though the
father had legal custody of the child and
there was no separation or divorce, or
3
similar type of family discord present.
Both the appellate division and the Court of
Appeals agreed that the father was not required to furnish support past the daughter's
twenty-first birthday when the daughter had
placed herself beyond effective control of
34
her father.
The chronological sequence of events in
the instant case should be recalled in order
to demonstrate that, although the appellate
division and the Court of Appeals held that
the daughter forfeited all right to support,
the father was in fact obligated to furnish
support for a certain period after his daughter abandoned her home. It should be remembered that the daughter moved offcampus, sold her car, lived with friends during her summer vacation and brought suit

259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966).
The daughter's natural mother died when she
was only three years old. In a certain sense it
can be said, although the family court does not
mention it, that the family unit of natural father,
mother and child had, in fact, been disrupted by
the death of the natural mother.
34 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 74.

in the family court. Moreover, she secured
an order requiring her father to pay for the
pending fall college term and to provide all
reasonable medical expenses, and also obtained a subsequent order directing payment
of $250 per month. Both appellate courts
upheld the first order and reversed the
second, $250 per month order. However,
as these courts indicated, the actions of
the daughter in moving off campus and failing to return to her father's home caused her
to forfeit all right to support. Yet, it is curious to note that although the daughter took
these actions prior to the pending fall college term and, thus, presumably, at this
point in time forfeited all future support
rights, the father was ultimately held liable
for the expenses of the forthcoming term.
It would appear more consistent for the
appellate courts to have held that since the
daughter forfeited all support rights prior
to the start of the school year in September,
1970, the father was not obligated to pay
the expenses of that term.
Although we have thus far exclusively
focused upon the obligations of a parent to
35
his offspring, under the common law it
was clear that minors were subject to their
parents' directions and were required to be
obedient during their minority and to honor
and revere their parents thereafter. 36 Under
more recent case law, children are obligated
to observe any reasonable regulation that
parents may impose.3 7 In addition, it has
also been held that in return for their sup-

32

33

35 1

W.
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446, supra

note 8.
36

id. 453.

37 Haskell v. Haskell, 201 App. Div. 414, 194
N.Y.S. 28 (1st Dep't), aff'd 236 N.Y. 635, 142
N.E. 314 (1923).

18
port obligations, parents are rightly entitled
to the companionship and custody of their
childrenA8 In the instant case the Court of
Appeals did not take issue with such precedent and reaffirmed the reciprocal obligations of minor children to their parents. a
Customarily, in the area of a third-party
volunteer supplying necessities to a minor,
the law is well settled; that it is irrelevant
how derelict a father may have been in
meeting his parental obligations, he is under
no legal obligation, in the absence of a statutory enactment, to reimburse the volunteer for necessities he may have furnished,
unless there is an express or implied obligation. 40 To allow a third party to intervene
in the place of the parent would tend to
undermine the parent's legal authority to
correct any act of misconduct by his minor
41
child.
The appellate division's decision in the
instant case pointed out that a parent is entitled to set reasonable standards, rules and
regulations. 42 This principle was impliedly
adopted by the Court of Appeals by citation
to Stant v. Lamberson.43 For Stant held that
submission to reasonable restraints and

White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 81 A.2d 450
(1951).
39 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 74.
40 Gotts v. Clark, 78 Ill. 229 (1875); McMillen
v. Lee, 78 111. 443 (1875); French v. Benton, 44
N.H. 28 (1862); Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J.L.
383 (1876).
41 In Re Carl, 174 Misc. 985, 22 N.Y.S.2d 782
(Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1940) (it is a parent's duty to correct any act of misconduct of his
child).
42 36 App. Div. 2d 162, 318 N.Y.S. 975 (1st
Dep't 1971).
43 103 Ind. App. 411, 8 N.E.2d 115 (1937).
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habits of propriety, obedience and confornmity to domestic discipline are required
from the child under the principles of both
natural and civil law.'14 Thus, the parent has
the right, in the absence of caprice, misconduct or neglect, to demand of his child adherence to reasonable standards. 45 In this
regard it is the father's paramount right to
4
supervise the education of his children.
It is worth noting that although the prior
thrust of the law had been to place the main
emphasis of support on the father, statutes
have been adopted which provide that a
married woman is a joint guardian of her
children.4 7 Thus, under such statutes both
parents will have equal powers, rights and
obligations with respect to the education of
48
their offspring.
In the instant case, a father was relieved
of his obligation to support his minor
daughter once she abandoned his home and
effectively placed herself beyond his control. However, the implication of this decision is not precisely clear in a situation in
which a minor child has not abandoned his
parents' home and has not placed himself
beyond their effective control; yet, while
remaining at home, insists on maintaining
his own life-style, or drops out of school or,

38

44 Id. at 412, 8 N.E.2d at 117.
45 29 N.Y.2d at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 75.
46 Griston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60
N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1946).
47 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWS § 81 (McKinney
1964). See FOSTER & FREED § 23:3.
48 Marks v. New York, 101 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1950). Where the father abandons his family without providing for support
the mother has the duty of supporting her child.
Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. Richmond County 1942).
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in general, refuses to obey his parents' commands. If a parent then terminates support
for this recalcitrant minor by refusing, e.g.,
to purchase warm clothing in the winter or
to replace worn-out garments, it may be
profitable to speculate on the prospects for
judicial action. The Court of Appeals
stressed, as a fundamental principle, that a
parent must support even a delinquent
minor child. So, it would appear that as
long as the child remains at home the
parent is legally obligated to support the
child, his delinquency notwithstanding. But,
if the parent failed to do so, would a court
even entertain a support action? The Court
of Appeals has very strongly stressed its
reluctance to become involved in parentchild disputes which should be resolved by
the parties. In the future, courts may inter-

pret the instant case as a very strong and
clear signal to avoid such family disputes,
absent evidence of a clear and present
danger, caused by the parent's dereliction
of duty, to the minor's morals, health or
welfare.
In any event, this decision must be
viewed as a reaffirmation of the primacy of
parental authority in establishing reasonable
standards which must be obeyed by a child.
Additionally, it should serve as notice to
minors chafing under the yoke of parental
restrictions, that to abandon a parent's
house is to forfeit any legal right to support
and, quite likely, even to a judicial hearing
absent a showing of either actual or potential injury to the minor's morals or mental
or physical condition.

